Volume 8, Issue 3, June 2019, Page: 101-106
The Evolution of Post-War International Financial Sanctions and Its Enlightenment on China
Zhu Lei, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China
Received: Feb. 28, 2019;       Accepted: May 23, 2019;       Published: Jun. 19, 2019
DOI: 10.11648/j.ss.20190803.15      View  123      Downloads  12
Abstract
International financial sanctions have been increasingly used since the World War II. But what about the rationality? For the developing countries, especially China, the second largest economy in the world, how can it maintain its financial security in the context of China’s major country diplomacy in the new era and in the transition from a trade power to a financial power? This paper begins with the definition of international financial sanctions by analyzing the characteristics of international financial sanctions. Next, it sorts out its historical evolution process and then discusses the rationality of its existence. It is concluded that the implementation of relevant sanctions should be decided by the U.N. Security Council in the way of resolution. The secondary sanctions are in essence a tool for the U.S. with unique financial advantages to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and lack international legitimacy. Finally, it’s suggested that on one hand, China needs to take precautions in financial sanctions imposed by other countries; on the other hand, China should have a correct understanding of financial sanctions and give full play to non-violent means such as financial sanctions so as to maintain its core national interests. Therefore, China should promote the reform of the UN sanctions system and improve its domestic system.
Keywords
International Financial Sanctions, Evolution, Rationality, China
To cite this article
Zhu Lei, The Evolution of Post-War International Financial Sanctions and Its Enlightenment on China, Social Sciences. Vol. 8, No. 3, 2019, pp. 101-106. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20190803.15
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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